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JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT: EVIDENCE OF 
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION’S EFFECT IN NEWSPAPER 
OPINION 
NEAL ALLEN* 
The United States Supreme Court, with its landmark racial integration 
case, Brown v. Board of Education,1 stimulated a heated debate in the editorial 
pages of Southern newspapers. This debate encompassed arguments not just 
about the rightness or wrongness of the decision, but also included discussion 
of the roles of courts, states, and law in the American constitutional system. 
For example, S.F. Moody of Birmingham, Alabama wrote on June 16, 1954 
about the proper application of Article V, Section 4 of the US Constitution, the 
republican guarantee clause: 
A state is not a republic in which the ruler or group of rulers, dedicated to rule 
at will, can truly tell the subjects that the sovereignty resides in himself or the 
group possessed with the powers to rule. Likewise, when the court directs 
social problems and abolishes traditions in the name of law when there is no 
law covering such matters, there is a complete denial of a republican form of 
government.2 
Moody’s letter, arguing for a more restrained role for courts, drew a response 
from Charles M. Kidd of Birmingham, who argued on June 22 that 
[t]he Supreme Court of the United States is given complete power to exercise 
the law in connection with our Constitution, and concerning any action which 
will in the long run improve our country. . . . Could we venture so far as to say 
that our republic is downfalling? Certainly not, but we could say and should 
say that our republic is even strengthened by this decision abolishing 
segregation.3 
This exchange is indicative of the kind of debate stimulated by the Supreme 
Court with its Brown decision. This article analyzes Southern editorials and 
 
* Neal Allen, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wichita State University, neal.allen@ 
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 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2. S.F. Moody, Jr., Letter to the Editor, Court’s Decision Accused of Being Tyrannical, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 16, 1954, at 10. 
 3. Charles M. Kidd, Letter to the Editor, Nation Strengthened by Supreme Court Decision, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 22, 1954, at 14. 
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letters to the editor and finds a sizable and substantively distinctive effect of 
Brown on discussion of race. I find that the Court stimulated an increase in the 
volume of discussion of racial issues and reoriented that discussion of race to 
constitutional issues. 
This article presents a theory of “judicialization” that identifies and 
describes the effect of a Supreme Court opinion outside of the judicial system. 
My focus is on how a decision shapes and transforms debate, instead of how 
much compliance or support follows a decision. I am most directly concerned 
with how, and to what extent, the Court can affect political debate, and how it 
affected Southern political debate with Brown v. Board of Education, in 
particular. When the Court judicializes political conflict, it reshapes it in the 
form of the appellate legal process.4 Discussion in a given issue area that 
previously focused on the desirability or effectiveness of a given public policy 
is now also focused on issues of constitutionality. Participants in the debate, 
after the judicializing decision from the high court, argue about the 
constitutionality of public policy, the proper role of governing entities like 
states and the federal government, and the proper theory used to interpret the 
Constitution. 
A decision like Brown expands the scope of constitutional argument, 
involving more political actors in the process of judicial review. Appellate 
courts engage in two processes: statutory interpretation and judicial review. 
While statutory interpretation is concerned with whether a given piece of 
legislation is being interpreted and applied correctly, judicial review is the 
process of testing whether a given action of government is consistent with the 
Constitution. Judicial review is concerned with the Constitution as higher law, 
and what kind of legislation or execution of legislation is impermissible under 
that higher law. 
When individual citizens, like the Alabamians cited above, debate the 
proper application of the Constitution to a particular public policy like school 
segregation, they are engaged in a kind of constitutional interpretation. This 
expanded judicial review debate lacks the concrete mechanism for finality that 
appellate courts possess. Supreme Court justices debate over the proper 
application of judicial review, and they eventually vote for one of the 
competing interpretations. The issuance of an opinion or opinions brings the 
discussion to a close, at least until the justices decide to begin the process 
again. Debate outside the Court has no means of ending debate; discussion 
continues as long as there are people interested in discussing. The only means 
of achieving finality are elections, but only if those elections are contested on 
the same issues as the judicialized public debate, and the elections produce a 
 
 4. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 7 (1991). 
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stable governing majority of representatives who are committed to a common 
constitutional and policy vision.5 
A major component of this judicialized political debate, stimulated but not 
controlled by a Supreme Court opinion, is the social/political doctrine. This 
paper argues that when a Court opinion stimulates discussion, that discussion 
often takes the form of constitutional doctrine. These doctrinal arguments are 
legal in focus, but arise from core commitments of parts of society and politics. 
While white Southerners responded to Brown with an alternate constitutional 
vision, that vision was influenced and motivated by regional commitments to 
white supremacy and institutional structures that protected white supremacy.6 
Thus that doctrine was social and political, as well as legal. The arguments that 
interested groups put forth in response to a Supreme Court opinion will 
articulate and reveal existing social/political doctrine. This doctrine will have 
the characteristics of constitutional doctrine, with theories of interpretation, 
identification of sacred higher law texts, conceptions of institutional design, 
and logical arguments. These doctrinal positions will support, oppose, or both 
support and oppose the Court opinion. 
Here it is significant not merely that in the 1950s the Court stimulated 
increased opposition to school integration in the South.7 The form of argument 
used by Southern defenders was legal and constitutional, opposing the 
foundations of the Court’s integration arguments.8 White Southern leaders did 
not merely disagree with Chief Justice Warren’s assertion that separate 
institutions were inherently unequal, or that all citizens were entitled to equal 
treatment from federal and state government.9 White Southerners presented a 
developed alternate constitutional doctrine, still working with the Constitution 
as the primary sacred text.10 Defenders of segregation added to their 
interpretive theory new sacred texts, like the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions and the writings of John C. Calhoun.11 They offered a state-
centered creation story to counter the Marshallian nationalist origins assumed 
 
 5. See id. at 160–62. 
 6. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 46–48, 60–62 
(2000). 
 7. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 389–408 (2004). 
 8. POWE, supra note 6, at 60–62. 
 9. See id. at 58–62. 
 10. See id. 
 11. Id.; see also Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 10, 1798, Nov. 14, 1799), 
reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 131–35 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987); James Madison, Virginia Resolution (Dec. 21, 1798), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 135–36 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); JOHN C. CALHOUN, I 
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (1853). 
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for the Union by Warren.12 White southerners also grounded their thinking in 
the concept of interposition, which was at the core of their understanding of 
institutional design.13 
The presentation of social/political doctrine is an important component of 
the effect of a transformative Court opinion, because it allows for a kind of 
communication between the Court and its adversaries, in a type of discourse 
that is shaped by the arguments and institutional characteristics of the 
judiciary. The presentation of arguments in a doctrinal form by Court 
opponents allows for debate with groups in government and society who 
support the general issue position of the Court, but for different reasons or 
from different perspectives. This article makes use of newspaper opinion as a 
sample and reflection of the broader debate about race stimulated by Brown, 
and uses the theory of judicialization to analyze this data. 
I.  DATA AND METHODS 
This article is an empirical examination of the Court’s indirect effect, 
testing whether the judicialization model discussed above describes discussion 
of race in the 1950s South. To provide data demonstrating Brown’s effect on 
political debate in the South, I examine every editorial or letter to the editor 
mentioning or discussing race or segregation in five Southern daily newspapers 
from 1950 to 1956. I examine two large metropolitan papers, the Richmond 
News-Leader and the Birmingham News. I also look at three smaller papers 
published in small cities, the Bryan (TX) Eagle, the Florence (SC) Morning 
News, and the Meridian (MS) Daily Star. 
I argue that Brown should increase the frequency and constitutional 
content of debate on Southern editorial pages, and that the debate will take the 
form of an alternate constitutional doctrine to that propounded by the Supreme 
Court. From my judicialization theory I derive three empirical implications, or 
expectations. First, I expect that Southern newspapers will publish more 
editorials and letters about race and segregation after Brown is issued than 
before the decision, owing to increased attention to the issue of race once 
segregation is under perceived threat. Second, I expect that more editorials and 
letters to the editor concerning race will discuss constitutional issues after 
Brown than before the decision, with elite and mass political actors adopting 
the discourse and subject matter of constitutional interpretation. Third, I expect 
that the editorials and letters to the editor, taken together, will take a doctrinal 
position on race and segregation, and present constitutional arguments to 
support that position. 
 
 12. POWE, supra note 6, at 58–60. 
 13. Id. 
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The evidence found for the third expectation, involving the substantive 
content of editorials and letters to the editor, is the core finding of this article. 
The first two quantitative expectations, however, support the qualitative 
argument in that they help to establish that judicialization is prevalent and 
significant. If discussion was reshaped by the Court into a form paralleling 
appellate courts, but such discussion was sparse and infrequent, then the 
content of discussion would not be crucial to an understanding of Brown’s 
effect. If editorials and letters making constitutional arguments made up only a 
small fraction of the increase in discussion of race, then judicialization would 
likewise not be very significant to a full understanding of Brown’s effect. 
Findings of frequency and constitutional focus, however, are evident and 
supportive of qualitative findings. 
The first two expectations lend themselves to some basic descriptive 
statistics, and the third (while possibly not a hypothesis, but a theoretical 
proposition) requires more interpretive evidence. The data set collected from 
Southern newspapers 1950–56 provides data supporting all three expectations. 
Editorials and letters to the editor speak to the concerns of this inquiry, in that 
they are public expressions of argumentative positions about race in the era of 
Brown v. Board of Education. As arguments, they consist, with varying 
degrees of logic and complexity, of propositions supported by evidence. As 
arguments, they can demonstrate the importance of constitutional concerns in 
discussion before and after the Supreme Court decisions. 
The selection of data is not random, which limits claims about its 
representativeness of Southern or American opinion in the 1950s. This 
nonrandomness, however, is also an asset for this inquiry. Writers of editorials 
and letters to the editor chose to express their opinions publicly, evidencing 
some degree of thought about the issue of race.14 Thus these data are unlikely 
to reflect what public opinion researchers call “non-attitudes”—statements that 
do not reflect well-thought-out opinions, but merely on-the-spot reactions to 
posed questions.15 Writers of editorials and letters in this data set are likely to 
 
 14. See TAEKU LEE, MOBILIZING PUBLIC OPINION: BLACK INSURGENCY AND RACIAL 
ATTITUDES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 106 (2002). Lee makes similar use of nonrandom data to 
analyze historical public opinion. He uses letters to the president as a proxy for informed public 
opinion, sampling one of every twenty letters from 1948–65. He argues that this data is more 
indicative of public opinion than survey responses, since letter data is created by individuals who 
have thought about an issue and formed an opinion, instead of being created by an interaction 
between an individual and a survey. The kind of effects that are the subject of my qualitative 
analysis would not be evident in a survey, but are evident in editorials and letters sent to 
newspapers. 
 15. JAMES S. FISHKIN, WHEN THE PEOPLE SPEAK: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY & PUBLIC 
CONSULTATION 3–4 (2009). 
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have been active and thoughtful participants in a national and regional 
conversation, and likely to shape discussion about race and segregation.16 
I focus on debate in the South for both theoretical and practical reasons. 
While the eleven former Confederate states were not the only states operating 
segregated school systems, the South was home to the largest concentration of 
blacks in America, and to the most entrenched and pervasive form of racial 
segregation.17 Thus reaction to Brown was most pronounced in Southern states, 
even though only one of the five desegregation cases decided on May 17, 1954 
was from a Southern state.18 Brown was regarded as a direct challenge to 
regional customs, traditions, and ways of life, and thus provoked a massive 
reaction.19 Focusing on the South allows me to examine reaction to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in a relatively unfiltered form, since white Southern 
opposition to integration became dominant in many Southern states before 
other important events involving integration, like the 1957 integration of Little 
Rock High School in Arkansas and the protest movements of the 1960s.20 
Also, focusing mainly on Southern reactions allows me to assemble a data set 
of five newspapers from different parts of the South, making my sample a 
more representative regional sample, instead of having one Southern paper in a 
larger national data set. 
The five-newspaper data set is representative of the 1950s South in several 
important ways. While all five papers are dailies, the Richmond and 
Birmingham are major metropolitan dailies, while the Florence, Meridian, and 
Bryan papers are small city dailies. Having data from large and small papers 
captures both metropolitan and rural opinion. Small city papers are the best 
approximation of a rural paper for this inquiry, since most small-town papers 
are weekly and would not provide enough data and also may not be available 
on microfilm. The five papers are also differentiated by subregion, with 
Birmingham, Alabama, Meridian, Mississippi, and Florence, South Carolina in 
the Deep South, and Richmond, Virginia and Bryan, Texas in the Peripheral 
South. 
The states served by the five papers examined here also differ in their 
immediate connection to the Supreme Court decision in 1954. Clarendon 
County, South Carolina was the origin of Briggs v. Elliott, one of Brown’s 
companion cases.21 School districts in Virginia and Texas were the subject of 
 
 16. See LEE, supra note 14, at 106. 
 17. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 128 (3d ed. 1974). 
 18. KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 292. 
 19. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950S, at 67 (1969). 
 20. See KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 390–91. 
 21. Briggs v. Elliot, 342 U.S. 350 (1952). 
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desegregation orders issued by federal judges in 1956.22 Court-ordered 
integration did not come to Alabama and Mississippi for over a decade after 
Brown and Brown II, the 1955 implementation decision.23 The data set 
includes one paper, the Richmond News-Leader, which was a regional and 
national leader in forming a counterargument to the Court on integration.24 
Thus many letters are written in response to editorials in that paper about 
integration, and are therefore once-removed from Brown in the causal chain. 
The Richmond paper provides the strongest example of the judicialized debate, 
but the other four papers provide corroborating evidence.25 All these important 
differences among the five chosen newspapers make the data set as 
representative as possible, considering the labor required to sort through six 
and a half years of each newspaper, a period encompassing over 2,000 days of 
coverage.26 
I chose the period from June 1, 1950 to November 31, 1956 for reasons of 
substance and practicality. The foremost advantage of studying newspaper 
opinion in that time period is that Brown occurs in the middle of it, on May 17, 
1954.27 Thus I can track change in response to Supreme Court action. Also 
Brown is the only major Supreme Court decision on race in the period,28 
although there is some discussion of the 1950 Sweatt v. Painter decision, 
which ordered that state law schools be integrated, in the beginning of the 
period.29 Also, the Little Rock crisis of 1957 is outside of the scope of the data 
set, as are all major direct action protest events except for the Montgomery bus 
boycott of 1955. The regional and temporal features of the five-newspaper data 
set allow for a focus on Brown as the event that caused increases in, and 
transformation of, the discussion of race. 
I constructed this data set with a two-step sorting process. First I collected 
every editorial or letter to the editor that discussed race. An opinion piece was 
classified as discussing race if it used the words “Negro” or “colored,” or if it 
referred specifically to a particular race or ethnicity, or to racial minorities. 
 
 22. KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 414. 
 23. ROSENBERG, supra note 4, at 50–54. 
 24. POWE, supra note 6, at 58–60; KLARMAN, supra note 7, at 395, 417. 
 25. See infra Table 1. 
 26. The number of days of editorial opinion examined differs slightly from paper to paper, 
since some did not publish on Sunday, or did not have an editorial page on Sunday. Also some 
papers did not publish on certain holidays. The data set also does not include opinion from 
February 1–15, 1953 of the Richmond News-Leader, due to a missing reel in the microfilm 
collection of the Center for Research Libraries. 
 27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 28. The only Supreme Court cases that are frequently discussed in the newspaper opinion 
under review here are the cases that became the Brown decision, in particular Briggs v. Elliott in 
South Carolina. See Briggs v. Elliot, 132 F.Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955). 
 29. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
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Explicit discussion of “civil rights” qualified as race discussion, as did any 
explicit or implicit mention of segregation or integration. Pieces using terms 
like “FEPC,” the acronym for the Fair Employment Practices Commission, 
were included if in context the writer was referring to the FEPC in its dealings 
with racial discrimination, since that federal agency dealt with other kinds of 
discrimination. Mentions of “the Supreme Court’s recent decision” were only 
classified as discussion of race if the context made clear that the decision 
discussed was Brown or another race relations decision. This sorting collected 
648 editorials and 791 letters, taken from over 10,000 daily editions of the five 
newspapers. Table 1 lists the breakdown of editorials and letters by 
newspaper.30 All papers usually published several editorials, although the 
Richmond and Bryan papers occasionally published only one. The Bryan and 
Florence papers published letters so infrequently that they do not provide data 
useful for this analysis. The Meridian paper normally printed one letter to the 
editor, and the Richmond and Birmingham papers, most days, printed several, 
with Richmond occasionally printing more than a dozen. 
I then coded the observations for the presence of one or more of four 
frames: constitutional, economic, religious, and Cold War. Many scholars, 
notably Gamson, have discussed the importance of frames as conceptual 
structures that condition the presentation and reception of information and 
argument.31 I argue that the Supreme Court discussed race using a 
constitutional frame, and Southerners responded with arguments presented 
through a constitutional frame. Editorials and letters also show use of other 
frames as well, although they are not as prevalent as the constitutional frame. 
An opinion piece was coded as constitutional, or as using a constitutional 
frame, if it discussed one of the following issues or topics: the Supreme Court 
or other courts, the constitutionality of government actions, interpreting the 
Constitution, the structure of the political system, or the relationship between 
political institutions like states and the federal government. A piece was coded 
as using an economic frame if it discussed the national or local economy, 
employment, economic prosperity or growth, or the connection between race 
and economics. A piece was coded as religious if it discussed race with 
reference to Christianity or another religion, supported an argument with 
reference to religious authority, or if the writer used phrases like “God help us” 
or “Almighty God” when discussing racial issues. A piece was coded as using 
a Cold War frame if the writer linked racial issues to the Soviet Union, 
communism, or socialism. Some editorials and letters used more than one 
frame, and were coded as such. 
 
 30. See infra Table 1. 
 31. WILLIAM A. GAMSON, TALKING POLITICS 4–7 (1992). 
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II.  FINDINGS 
Concerning frequency, my theory generates an expectation that there will 
be more editorials and letters to the editor that discuss race after Brown than 
before the decision. Analysis of the newspaper data follows the expected 
pattern. Table 2 presents the frequency of editorials before and after May of 
1954.32 The five newspapers published 4.5 editorials per month before the 
decision, and 13.9 per month after, more than tripling after May of 1954.33 
Since the Richmond News-Leader devoted such a large part of its editorial 
pages to presentation of the constitutional argument against integration, 
devoting the entire editorial page to the theory of “interposition” for months in 
late 1955 and early 1956, I also analyzed the editorial data without the Virginia 
paper.34 Table 3 presents those results, showing an increase from 3.4 editorials 
per month before the decision to 9.5 per month after, nearly the same 
percentage increase as the full sample.35 Table 1 shows the number of 
editorials by year, with years designated in distance from May of 1954.36 The 
fifth year, beginning with the month of the Supreme Court decision, shows the 
sharpest increase in discussion.37 
Letters to the editor that discuss race also increase in number after Brown, 
and the increase is much larger than that observed in editorials.38 Table 4 
shows these results, with an increase from 2.2 letters per month before the 
decision to 22.0 per month after,39 and Table 2 shows the increase in editorials 
 
 32. See infra Table 2. For purposes of quantitative analysis, the entire month of May 1954 is 
counted as after the Supreme Court decision, even though it was handed down on the 17th and 
reported in newspapers on the 18th. When the data are analyzed by year, the years used begin 
with May of the calendar year. If considering the entire month of May 1954 as after the decision 
would have any affect on the findings of this paper, it would be to slightly reduce the observed 
impact of Brown. Since May 1–17 is such a small part of the time studied, any effect on analysis 
is minimal or nonexistent. 
 33. See infra Table 2. 
 34. See Frances L. Baer, Resistance to Public School Desegregation Arkansas, Little Rock, 
and Beyond, in LAW & SOCIETY RECENT SCHOLARSHIP 61, 61–80 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2008). 
 35. See infra Table 3. 
 36. See infra Table 1. 
 37. See infra Table 1 and Table 2. Both Table 1, showing frequency of editorials, and Table 
2, showing frequency of letters, show the highest frequency in 1955 and 1956, not in 1954. This 
might be a result of a lagged effect of Brown, or an effect of Brown II, in June 1955. Two events, 
however, may explain the lagged increase. Discussion of race in Birmingham spiked in response 
to the attempt of a black student, Autherine Lucy, to enter the University of Alabama. See 
generally DR. JACK KUSHNER, COURAGEOUS JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN ALABAMA 75 (2011). In 
Virginia, discussion of race increased surrounding a special session of the state legislature, and 
letters increased in response to a series of editorials, discussed below, that attempted to influence 
that special session. See generally BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA’S MASSIVE RESISTANCE 24–38 
(1961). Both these events, however, were to a great extent results of Brown. 
 38. See infra Table 4. 
 39. See infra Table 4. 
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by month.40 This tenfold increase is much larger than the threefold increase 
observed in editorials. The difference might be due to the fact that newspaper 
editorial writers, as members of the Southern elite, were likely aware of the 
potential threats to segregation, from both courts and non-Southerners in the 
legislative and executive branches. Thus editorial writers began the 1950s with 
a substantial interest in racial issues, with Brown contributing to an increased 
focus in the middle of the decade. The decision was a greater shock to the mass 
of Southern whites, who could no longer count on their elected leaders to 
prevent a challenge to segregation coming from the national government.41 
I also analyzed the letter to the editor data without the Richmond News-
Leader, which provided over two-thirds of the letters.42 Table 5 presents those 
results. The sample with Richmond removed, which is mostly Birmingham 
letters, showed an increase from .69 letters per month before Brown to 5.9 
letters per month after the decision.43 The increase was similar, but slightly 
smaller in percentage terms, than that observed in the full sample.44 
My second empirical expectation derived from my judicialization theory is 
that a larger percentage of editorials and letters to the editor will present 
constitutional arguments, or utilize constitutional frames, after the decision 
than before. To capture such an increase I calculate the percentage of editorials 
that are coded as constitutional for each year studied. I designate year periods 
from May of 1954 in order to capture the effect of Brown. Table 6 presents the 
results of this analysis, showing that in the fifth year studied constitutional 
editorials jumped from 19% to 45% of total editorials discussing race.45 Table 
7 presents a more focused analysis, with 23% of editorials before Brown 
making constitutional arguments, and 47% making constitutional arguments 
 
 40. See infra Table 2. 
 41. I must make one caveat to my treatment of letters to the editor as data indicative of 
Southern mass opinion in the 1950s. These letters are a clearly nonrandom sample not just 
because the writer had to decide to submit a letter, but also because a newspaper editor had to 
decide to print the letter. I have no way of knowing how many letters sent to the five newspapers 
in my sample were not printed, or whether the unprinted letters differ in substantively important 
ways from the printed letters. The printed letters, however, are from both supporters and 
opponents of the Supreme Court; some make constitutional arguments, some do not. This 
diversity leads me to infer that editors were not excluding certain letters based on the argument of 
writers. Also the quantitative and qualitative findings of this article are robust enough to be valid 
even if there was some substantive filtration of letters. I am using the letter and editorial data to 
advance a particular empirical interpretation of Brown’s effect, not to paint an exactly 
representative picture of Southern public opinion in the 1950s. 
 42. See infra Table 5. 
 43. See infra Table 5. 
 44. Compare infra Table 5, with infra Table 4. 
 45. See infra Table 6. 
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after.46 Table 8 presents the same analysis with data from the Richmond News-
Leader removed, with a greater percentage increase, from 10% to 33%.47 
Letters to the editor show a parallel increase in the proportion of 
constitutional argumentation after Brown. Table 9 shows the percentage of 
constitutional letters by year, with years after May 1954 showing a higher 
percentage of letters making constitutional arguments.48 Table 10 shows that 
before Brown, letters making constitutional arguments constituted 21% of the 
total, and after the decision were 55% of the total.49 Table 11 presents results 
for the sample without Richmond letters, showing an increase from 3% to 
41%.50 
If Brown had the judicializing effect that I claim here, the constitutional 
frame should be more prevalent than other frames after the decision. Tables 12 
and 13 show such a relationship, with use of constitutional frames 
outnumbering use of the other three frames after May of 1954.51 The only 
other frame that is significantly more common after the decision is the 
religious frame in the letters sample.52 While the constitutional frame is nearly 
three times as prevalent, the religious frame is used in 127 out of 683 letters 
after Brown.53 Much of this use of religious frames comes from the argument 
that segregation is ordained by God, a particular religious argument not often 
found in editorials. Such religious argument would likely be made by letter 
writers in response to any threat to segregation, not just one coming from the 
Supreme Court. 
Quantitative analysis of newspaper opinion demonstrates that discussion of 
race increased sharply after Brown, and that discussion was often carried on 
using constitutional argument.54 The most interesting finding of this article, 
however, comes from textual analysis of editorials and letters to the editor. I 
find that the arguments made in response to Brown constitute an ongoing 
dialogue about the nature of the American constitutional system and 
demonstrate how the Supreme Court stimulated nonjudicial actors to engage in 
constitutional argument. 
The best and most coherent example of judicialized argument, and in 
particular social/political doctrine, is the editorial campaign waged on the 
editorial pages of the Richmond News-Leader in late 1955 and early 1956. 
Within the conflict over integration that later played out in elections and street 
 
 46. See infra Table 7. 
 47. See infra Table 8. 
 48. See infra Table 9. 
 49. See infra Table 10. 
 50. See infra Table 11. 
 51. See infra Table 12 and Table 13. 
 52. See infra Table 13. 
 53. See infra Table 13. 
 54. See infra Table 1. 
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protests, white Southerners constructed an alternate constitutional vision.55 
Written by James J. Kilpatrick, these writings were an explicit attempt to give 
legal and constitutional form to the reactionary movement of the White 
South.56 Powe identifies the editorials as key documents in the development of 
the Southern resistance. “The political and intellectual problem facing the 
South was how to explain to itself and the rest of the nation why defying the 
Supreme Court of the United States was okay.”57 
The News-Leader editorials present a constitutional interpretation 
constructed around the concept of interposition, in which a state “interposes” 
itself between its citizens and an unjust federal government action.58 Thus, 
resistance to the Supreme Court decision was not unlawful, but “the highest 
possible example of fidelity to the compact.”59 According to Kilpatrick’s 
understanding, the moral and legal high ground is occupied by Southern 
Whites, with their “reverence for law, and our obedience to constituted 
authority.”60 This states’ rights-centered theory was justified with reference not 
just to the nature of the ratification of the Constitution, but to other documents 
like Jefferson and Madison’s Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and the 
writings of Calhoun. The Southern federalist theory is argued against the 
Court’s nationalism; individual rights are confronted by sovereign power. 
These editorials follow the form of what I call the production of 
social/political doctrine. Previously existing regional values are publicly 
presented as a coherent doctrine that is grounded in legal and historical 
authority. An interpretation of the Constitution is supplemented by the 
inclusion of supportive sacred texts into the constitutional canon. A revised 
founding narrative is offered as the foundation for opposition to the Court’s 
argument and directives. Thus the Court stimulates an intellectual process that 
replicates its own process, but using different inputs and ideas. 
Not only do the arguments of the Richmond paper’s Kilpatrick editorials 
follow the form of social/political doctrine, they were published in a form 
clearly meant to be taken as constitutional doctrine. The News Leader 
published them in a pamphlet called Interposition, and included supporting 
materials like the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, and writings by states’ 
rights proponents like Calhoun, John Taylor of Caroline, and Littleton Waller 
Tazewell, governor of South Carolina in the 1830s.61 These sacred texts were 
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included along with resolutions and reports of the Virginia legislature in 
support of massive resistance to integration.62 This pamphlet includes all the 
components of a social/political doctrine and was produced in opposition to 
Brown and to support the movement against the Court’s position.63 
In 1962, Kilpatrick wrote an extended book version of the argument 
presented in his 1955–56 editorials, called The Southern Case for School 
Segregation.64 In the introduction, he framed his project as the production of 
constitutional doctrine.65 
May it please the court: 
When this book was conceived, it was intended to be titled “U.S. v. the South: 
A Brief for the Defense,” but it seemed a cumbersome title and the finished 
work is not, of course, a brief for the South in any lawyer’s sense of the word. 
It is no more than an extended personal essay, presented in this form because 
the relationship that exists between the rest of the country and the South, in the 
area of race relations, often has the aspect of an adversary proceeding. We of 
the South see ourselves on the defensive, and we frequently find ourselves, as 
lawyers do, responding in terms of the law and the evidence.66 
This project, however, was not exclusively pursued by one newspaper over a 
few months, but by different newspapers and hundreds of letter writers across 
the South. Analysis of the five-newspaper data set finds that discussion of race 
shifted to a constitutional focus in the mid-1950s, and this shift was a result of 
Brown v. Board of Education.67 
Before moving to a discussion of post-Brown judicialized dialogue, it is 
important to examine dialogue before the Supreme Court decision. Race in 
general, and segregation in particular, were often discussed as public policy 
before the decision, and not in terms of constitutionality. An illustrative 
example is this passage, from the editorial “Crime and the Deep South, III” 
from the Richmond News-Leader on May 1, 1953, discussing the relationship 
between high murder rates and large black populations in Southern cities: 
The level of morality and respect for law indicated by these figures constitutes 
one of the principal reasons advanced by the South in defense of its historic 
public policy of racial segregation, though for some reason it is difficult to get 
our critics to recognize the facts. But these demonstrably high crime rates 
constitute more than that. They represent an economic loss and a social evil of 
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the first magnitude and they justify thoughtful study by leaders of both races to 
determine how the picture may be improved.68 
Segregation is discussed as a desirable governmental policy and resulting in 
reduction of crime.69 Argument about race does not here involve a vision of the 
constitutional system.70 
An editorial from the Bryan (TX) Eagle, titled “Public Housing,” 
published June 21, 1951, gives another example of discussion of race in terms 
of policy, not constitutionality: 
In the opinion of citizens of Bryan who are generally familiar with conditions 
the need for such a project is greater than it was a decade or more ago. In that 
period there has been a heavy influx of Mexicans and many of these families 
are in deplorable condition from the point of housing. Many Negro families are 
in no better condition.71 
This editorial, the only one in the data set discussing a minority group other 
than blacks, is concerned with segregation as public policy.72 It advocates the 
expansion of public housing, and argues this expansion should occur within the 
framework of segregation.73 A lengthy example of pre-Brown argument on 
race comes from an editorial published July 19, 1951 in the Florence (SC) 
Morning News, under the title “The North Could Profit by Studying Methods 
of the South in Handling of Race Riots.”74 
The South has never had a race riot equivalent to the one staged in Cicero, 
a suburb of Chicago, not even during the bitter Reconstruction days. 
It should stop the mouths of the Northern agitators who like to give the 
impression that the South is the only section of the nation where relations 
between the races is not what is ought to be. . . . [W]e [the South] recognize 
the problem for what it is and set up conditions in which the two races can live 
side by side peaceably and profitably.75 
This defense of segregation is made on policy grounds, not grounds of 
constitutionality or in terms of the proper organization of the political system.76 
Nonconstitutional, policy-focused arguments about race also were 
prevalent in letters to the editor before Brown. A letter signed “Meridian Home 
Owner” published December 19, 1950 in the Meridian (MS) Star calls for 
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more available housing for black citizens, arguing in terms of segregationist 
policy, not constitutionality: 
Southern Negroes are not clamoring for anti-segregation. They want homes 
where they can have peace, quiet, sanitary surroundings, where they can rear 
their children properly and enjoy the friendship and companionship of their 
own kind. They want to become first-class, taxpaying, home-owning citizens. 
They are part and parcel of the community.77 
Such support for segregationist public policy was also evident in a letter from 
Henry L. Jones of Birmingham, Alabama, published in the Birmingham News 
under the title of “Another Negro Park, or Improve Present One,” on August 
31, 1952: “There is no reason why the city cannot at least have a properly 
equipped park. There are a lot of places smaller than Birmingham which try to 
show that they are interested in their Negro population also.”78 This focus on 
policy, not constitutionality, was characteristic of discussion of race in the pre-
Brown period. 
The shock to the Southern social and political system that came from the 
high court in May of 1954 shifted the focus of Southern race debate to one of 
constitutionality.79 Segregation was still defended as desirable and effective 
public policy, but now the constitutional frame was most evident. Some of this 
constitutional argument concerned the practical questions raised by the Brown 
decision. The Birmingham News discussed issues of implementation in an 
editorial published on December 13, 1954, titled “Alabama Communities Vary 
Widely as to School Segregation Problem.” 
Alabama in some respects has the gravest problem of all the states in regard to 
carrying out the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that segregation should be 
abolished in public schools. No other state has a wider range in the proportions 
of the races which live in various counties. . . . [T]he school problems growing 
out of the court’s de-segregation decision can best be regarded as local with 
methods and timing in dealing with the situation having regard for the make-up 
of population. The situation surely is one that the Supreme Court recognizes 
and will consider in making its order of last May 17 effective.80 
Many other editorials and letters engaged in discussion of the direct effect of 
the Court’s ruling. 
Others, particularly the Richmond News-Leader, presented highly 
theoretical and historically grounded arguments for action that would preserve 
a “states’ rights” version of the constitutional system, a system which many 
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white Southerners believed was ordained by the Founding and the 
Constitution.81 The doctrine of interposition was also supported by other 
Southern newspapers. The Florence Morning News argued on January 8, 1956: 
There is a serious question in the minds of the Southern states as to whether or 
not the Supreme Court exceeded the rights and authority given it in the 
Constitution. Since the purity of the Constitution is at the heart of the test, 
Interposition would be an act to strengthen the Constitution. It would not 
challenge the Constitution. 
Recognizing the right of the States to challenge a questionable act places the 
burden of proof properly on the shoulders of the Federal Government. It must 
win support for its position by making the Court’s decree an acceptable 
amendment to the Constitution. The result, then, will bind all or none. As John 
Milton asked in a famous discussion of freedom, “What can be juster in a state 
than this?”82 
The prevalence of constitutional argument extended to facets of the debate 
over race outside of court-ordered integration. The Meridian (MS) Star 
editorialized on December 15, 1955 that “[u]nder the Constitution, the States 
are reserved the rights of operating their educational systems. As far as we can 
see, there is nothing in the Constitution to give the federal government any 
authority to operate schools in any state in the nation.”83 President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s school funding program was opposed on constitutional 
grounds.84 The Mississippi newspaper argued that such federal aid to schools 
was an impermissible alteration of the constitutional system, violative of the 
Constitution as higher law.85 
Letter writers also opposed integration on constitutional grounds during the 
period of judicialized debate that followed Brown. L.N. Formby of Picayune, 
Mississippi, writing in the Meridian (MS) Star June 12, 1956, argued that to 
win Southern votes, the Democratic Party should embrace a platform that 
supports 
the fight for States’ rights, including the right of every State to control and 
segregate its schools . . . [and] the right to maintain a Constitution and laws 
against sedition, treason and subversive acts to overthrow the State 
Government, and to maintain Constitutional provisions and laws for suitable 
police power within the state.86 
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Mrs. R.R. Johnson of Blackstone, Virginia argued on June 10, 1955 that the 
Supreme Court exceeded its rightful power under the constitution, and that 
judges should lose their life tenure: 
When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion that segregation in public 
schools was unconstitutional it exercised the limit of authority granted it by the 
supreme law of the land, the Constitution of the United States. . . . If the 
Constitution is no more stable than are the minds of the present members of the 
Supreme Court, then God help us! That document should be re-written and 
make its members, as are the President and members of Congress, subject to 
election by the people.87 
Mrs. Johnson’s constitutional critique, while not terribly sophisticated, is part 
of a broader phenomenon brought about by Supreme Court action. 
Constitutional argumentation, coming from both mass and elite actors, 
followed from the Court’s desegregation decisions of 1954 and 1955. 
Taken together, these instances of constitutional argumentation constitute 
the production and presentation of Southern white social/political doctrine. 
That doctrine was not created by the Supreme Court; it was at times evident in 
editorials before May of 1954, and certainly had roots in the Founding and 
Civil War. But the Court’s challenge to Southern social institutions and 
customs motivated the defenders of segregation to argue publicly in defense of 
their social system, and to make that argument in constitutional terms. 
Southern editorialists and writers of letters became advocates of a particular 
theory of constitutionality, and they advocated their position in the public 
forum of newspaper editorial pages. 
This greater focus on constitutionality and the increased frequency of 
discussion of race are, at minimum, strongly associated and correlated with 
Brown. I argue that the timing and substantive orientation of this quantitative 
and qualitative shift in the Southern discussion of race support the claim that 
Brown caused the transformation. The decision had an effect outside of the 
judicial system, and that affect took the form of judicialization, with the Court 
remaking political conflict in a manner consistent with its institutional identity 
as a Court. 
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Table 1: Editorials and Letters to the Editor by Newspaper 
 Number of Race 
Editorials, 1950-56
Number of Race 
Letters, 1950-56 
Richmond News-Leader 188 572 
Birmingham News 105 210 
Florence(SC) Morning News 250 n/a 
Meridian (MS) Star 72 8 
Bryan (TX) Eagle 33 n/a 
Total 648 791 





# per month Before Brown 
(49 Months) 
218 4.5 
# per month After Brown 
(31 Months) 
430 13.9 






# per month Before Brown 
(49 Months) 
165 3.4 
# per month After Brown 
(31 Months) 
295 9.5 





# per month Before Brown 
(49 Months) 
107 2.2 
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# per month Before Brown 
(49 Months) 
34 .69 
# per month After Brown 
(31 Months) 
184 5.9 
Table 6: Race Editorials Using Constitutional Frame by Year 
Year Const. Total % Const. 
June 1950 – 
April 1951 
26 69 38% 
May 1951 – 
April 1952 
12 57 22% 
May 1952 – 
April 1953 
2 38 5% 
May 1953 – 
April 1954 
10 52 19% 
May 1954 – 
April 1955 
47 105 45% 
May 1955 – 
April 1956 
93 189 49% 
May 1956 – 
Nov 1956 
63 136 46% 
Total 253 648 39% 








Before Brown  50 218 23% 
After Brown 203 430 47% 
Table 8: Percent of Editorials that use Constitutional Frame, before and after 







Before Brown  17 165 10% 
After Brown 96 295 33% 
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Table 9: Race Letters to the Editor Using Constitutional Frame by Year 
Year Const. Total % Const. 
June 1950 – 
April 1951 
1 21 5% 
May 1951 – 
April 1952 
4 24 2% 
May 1952 – 
April 1953 
5 17 29% 
May 1953 – 
April 1954 
13 32 41% 
May 1954 – 
April 1955 
100 173 58% 
May 1955 – 
April 1956 
215 381 56% 
May 1956 – 
Nov 1956 
63 129 49% 
Total 401 790 51% 
Note: The first year contains only 11 months, and the last year only seven 
months 








Before Brown  23 107 21% 
After Brown 378 683 55% 
Table 11: Percent of Letters that use Constitutional Frame, before and after 







Before Brown  1 34 3% 
After Brown 76 184 41% 
Table 12: Number of Editorials that use Constitutional Frames, Compared to 
Other Frames 
 Constitutional Economic Religious Cold War 
Before Brown 50 12 4 5 
After Brown 203 14 7 8 
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Table 13: Number of Letters to the Editor that use Constitutional Frames, 
Compared to Other Frames 
 Constitutional Economic Religious Cold War 
Before Brown  23 9 14 4 
After Brown 378 10 127 38 
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